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Miranda-Some History, Some Observations,
and Some Questions
Karl P. Warden*
After tracing the development of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination and the sixth amendment right to counsel,
Professor Warden makes a careful analysis of the pre-arraignment in-
terrogation rules laid down by the United States Supreme Court in the
recent case of Miranda v. Arizona. He raises some questions concerning
the foundations of these rules, and postulates some ethical problems
which may face the defense counselor as he tries to work with them.
Professor Warden concludes that only time will tell whether Miranda
marks the beginning of a new revolution in the development of criminal
procedure or merely the climax of an old one.
I. INTRODUCTION
"It is far 'pleasanter to sit comfortable in the shade rubbing red pepper
into a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up
evidence."'
I STEPHEN, HISTORY OF CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 442 n.1
At this writing Miranda v. Arizona' is less than four months old.
Although its place in the annals of leading constitutional decisions is
assured, its meaning for, and influence upon, the criminal law process
in the United States is not at all certain. It will require years of data
accumulation and analysis to determine how profound an effect it
will have and to evaluate that effect in terms of social impact.2 It is
too soon to know whether the Miranda case has started a new revolu-
tion in the administration of criminal justice or has merely ended an
old one. Is this the first loud cry of an ascent period of activism by the
Supreme Court in the field of criminal law, or is it the chant du
cygne of the old active phase? At the present time, only two things
are clear. First, the old imaginary lines that sometimes separated
confessions, and inculpatory and exculpatory statements have been
erased; in their place stands a highly visible requirement that courts
make inquiry into the import and effect of the environment in which an
accused's statements were made. Second, the right to counsel under
the sixth amendment and the privilege against self-incrimination under
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. The gloomy truth is that very little effort has been made in this country to
gather objective data on the impact of Supreme Court decisions on criminal law
enforcement.
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the fifth amendment are not isolated from each other, but rather arc
integral and integrated parts of the complex of fundamental rights
secured to citizens accused of crime. The scope of this interrelation-
ship is no more susceptible of being accurately measured at this time
than is the Miranda case capable of being forced into narrow and
well-delineated configurations. We must settle for thinner stuff. We can
only ask questions and make tenative observations for we are but par-
ticipant-observers in a new exploration through the jungles of crime
and criminal law.
II. THE MMANDA CASES
Four cases from different sections of the country were decided under
the style of Miranda v. Arizona.
First, in the Miranda case itself,3 the accused was arrested in
Phoenix for kidnapping and rape and taken to a local police station.
He was placed in an interrogation room where, after two hours, he
confessed. There is nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion to indi-
cate that any form of physical abuse was used. At the top of his
written confession was a typed paragraph stating that the confession
was voluntary, made without threats or promises, made after the ac-
cused had been told it could be used against him, and made "with
full knowledge of my legal rights . . . ."4 When the confession was
introduced at the trial, the police officers admitted that Miranda had
not been advised that he had a right to have an attorney present at
the interrogation.5 Unlike Danny Escobedo,6 Ernesto Miranda had
not requested an attorney during his interrogation.
Second, in Vignera v. New York,7 Vignera, a robbery suspect, was
picked up by the police and questioned. During the questioning he
orally admitted his part in the robbery. At the conclusion of the testi-
mony the trial judge instructed the jury:
The law doesn't say that the confession is void or invalidated because
the police officer didn't advise the defendant as to his rights. Did you
hear what I said, I am telling you what the law of the State of New
York is.8
In this case, as in Miranda, there was no evidence of physical brutality.
Third, in Westover v. United States,9 Westover was arrested and
charged with robbery by the Kansas City police. He was interrogated,
off and on, for two days, and there was no evidence that the city police
3. 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P.2d 716 (1965).
4. 384 U.S. at 492.
5. Ibid.
6. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1963).
7. 15 N.Y.2d 970, 207 N.E. 2d 527, 259 N.Y.2d 857 (1965).,
8. 384 U.S. at 493-94.
9. 342 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1965).
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ever warned him of his rights. After Westover had been in custody
for approximately fourteen hours, he was handed over to the F.B.I.
The F.B.I. did not remove Westover from the Kansas City police head-
quarters. They did inform him of his rights before they commenced
the interrogation. The incriminating statements growing out of this
latter interrogation were introduced at Westover's trial. As in the two
earlier cases, there was no evidence of physical abuse or of unduly
prolonged and physically exhausting interrogation.
Fourth, in California v. Stewart,10 Stewart was charged with kid-
napping to commit robbery, rape, and murder. He was interrogated
in isolation by the Los Angeles police over a period of five days before
he confessed. Since the record of the trial court did not show whether
Stewart was advised of his constitutional rights, the California Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that under the Escobedo doctrine he
should have been advised of his rights and that such advice would not
be presumed from a silent record. Again, nothing in the Supreme
Court indicates any.physical brutality; the five-day interrogation can-
not be understood to have been continuous, i.e., without opportunity
to eat or sleep.
The remarkable thing about these four cases is that they are un-
remarkable. Their facts, viewed singly or in the aggregate, do not
smell of the stuff of constitutional decisions. They are typical
examples of the daily result of the most mundane police precinct
investigations. The likelihood of any of them reaching the United
States Supreme Court was remote for the "blood of the accused" did
not stain their transcripts. In none do we find the traditional indicia of
the coerced confession. Yet, it is precisely because of their unremark-
able character that they were selected to illustrate the Plimsoll mark
of pre-arraignment interrogation procedure. To understand this one
must look briefly at the evolution of the interrogation process in the
United States Supreme Court."
III. SoME HISTORY
A. The Fifth Amendment-Due Process Cases
The Miranda decision was writfen to clarify and further amplify the
Court's decision in Escobedo v. Illinois.'2 Escobedo, decided in 1963,
brought together two separate lines of cases: the fifth amendment-
10. 43 Cal. Rptr. 201, 400 P.2d 97 (1965).
11. The use of confessions by the organized society against one subject to its power
must be as old as organized 'society itself. The special role of confession in- a criminal
trial has taproots deep in the history of the common law. Holdsworth states "The
privilege against self-ihdrimination was wholly unknown to the common law of this
period. It is not until after the Restoration that this privilege was recognized." 5
HoLDsWoRTH, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW 193-94 (1924).
12. Supra note 6.
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due process confession cases and the sixth amendment right to counsel
cases. To place the Miranda decision in proper perspective, it is neces-
sary to first look at each of these lines of cases. The traditional start-
ing point for an examination of the Supreme Court's interest in con-
fessions is Brain v. United States,13 a federal case decided in 1897.
There the accused was taken from the jail to a detective's private office,
stripped of his clothing, and interrogated; the resulting conversation
was offered as a confession at his trial. The Court concluded that the
nature of the defendant's situation and of the detective's questions
disspelled any notions that the defendant's responses were the product
of voluntary mental action. Then it said:
Looking at the doctrine as thus established, it would seem plainly to be
deducible that as the principle from which, under the law of nature, it
was held that one accused could not be compelled to testify against him-
self, was in its essence comprehensive enough to exclude all manifestations
of compulsion, whether arising from torture or from moral causes .... As the
facts by which compulsion might manifest itself, whether physical or
moral, would be necessarily ever different, the measure by which the in-
voluntary nature of the confession was to be ascertained was stated in the
rule, not by the changing causes, but by their resultant effect upon the
mind, that is, hope or fear, so that, however diverse might be the facts,
the test of whether the confession was voluntary would be uniform, that
is, would be ascertained by the condition of the mind which the causes
ordinarily operated to create. 1
4
The first state case which was reversed by the Supreme Court be-
cause of the use of an involuntary confession was the 1936 case of
Brown v. Mississippi.15 There the defendants were whipped until
they gave complete assent to a confession already prepared by the
police. The Court reversed the conviction on due process grounds
because the facts revolted its sense of justice. The question of the
relationship of the fifth amendment prohibition against self-incrimina-
tion to the states was not raised or answered. As Chief justice Traynor
has since observed:
For many years ... the United States Supreme Court consistently refrained
from extending the privilege [against self-incrimination] to the states under
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but there were por-
tents in the cases that there would be such an evolution. It materialized in
Malloy v. Hogan in 1964. The evolution was fostered, as Mr. Justice Bren-
nan noted in his opinion for the Court, by the gradual shift in the basis for
the exclusion of coerced confessions from the purported untrustworthiness
of such testimony to grounds of due process that in time became virtually
indistinguishable from the privilege against self-incrimination. Once the
privilege was clearly recognized as operative to inhibit state police inter-
13. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
14. Id. at 547-48.
15. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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rogations, it was a fortiori applicable to inhibit interrogations in state judicial
proceedings.
16
The long series of cases following Brown17 make it clear that when
there was substantial evidence that a confession introduced at the
trial was the product of coercion, the resultant conviction would not
be allowed to stand. The meaning of coercion was then expanded to
encompass more than actual physical beatings or unduly protracted
periods of interrogation without ample opportunity to eat or rest. The
best summary of this new attitude of the court toward the confession
cases was given by Mr. Chief Justice Warren in Blackburn v.
Alabama:
As important as it is that persons who have committed crimes be con-
victed, there are considerations which transcend the question of guilt or
innocence. Thus, in cases involving involuntary confessions, this Court en-
forces the strongly felt attitude of our society that important human values
are sacrificed where an agency of the government, in the course of securing
a conviction, wrings a confession out of an accused against his will. This
insistence upon putting the government to the task of proving guilt by means
other than inquisition was engendered by historical abuses which are quite
familiar.
But neither the likelihood that the confession is untrue nor the preservation
of the individual's freedom of will is the sole interest at stake. As we said
just last Term, 'The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary con-
fessions ... also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey
the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as
much endangered from legal methods used to convict those thought to be
criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.! Spano v. New York, . . .
360 U.S. 315, 320-321]. Thus a complex of values underlies the stricture
against use by the state of confessions which, by way of convenient short-
hand, this Court terms involuntary, and the role played by each in any situa-
tion varies according to the particular circumstances of the case.18
B. The Sixth Amendment-Right to Counsel Cases
At the same time that the coerced confession cases were being
decided under the fifth amendment, another seemingly separate line
16. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and
Trial, 21 REcoRD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 357, 365-66 (1966).
17. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Canty v. Alabama, 309 U.S. 629
(1940); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); Lomax v. Texas, 313 U.S. 544 (1941);
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941); Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942);
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944);
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954).
18. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-07 (1960). This "complex of values"
referred to by Mr. Chief Justice Warren was broad enough to encompass the accused
who was denied the right to telephone his wife and speak to his lawyer until he made
a statement, Hayes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963), and the confession of a
fourteen-year-old boy who did not have a lawyer, Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S.
49 (1962). The method adopted by the states to determine "voluntariness" might
also be inadequate or improper. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
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of cases involving the right of an accused to have access to an attorney
evolved under the sixth amendment. Between the 1932 case of Powell
v. Alabama'9 and the 1963 case of Escobedo v. Illinois,20 over fifty
right-to-counsel cases were decided by the Court. Unlike the slow
reception given the more esoteric ideas involved in the fifth amend-
ment coerced confession cases, the bench, bar and public were in-
clined to accept readily the sixth amendment right to counsel cases
as a legitimate part of our basic "rights." The rationale for ignoring a
reliable confession from a "guilty" man is, perhaps, more difficult to
appreciate than are the reasons for allowing an accused man to have
a lawyer represent him. Nevertheless, both lines of cases eventually
converged in the Escobedo case.
C. The Escobedo Case
The Escobedo decision was couched in sixth amendment language,
yet it dealt with a traditional fifth amendment problem. Danny
Escobedo had asked to see his lawyer and his lawyer had repeatedly
asked to see him. The police refused all such requests and managed
to obtain a series of incriminating statements from Escobedo. These
statements were offered at the trial and Escobedo was convicted. The
Supreme Court reversed, and in so doing merged sixth amendment and
fifth amendment rights to produce a total constitutional doctrine, ap-
plicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment, which should
have largely crystallized the pre-arraignment rights of an accused. Mr.
Justice Goldberg, speaking for the Court, wrote these now famous
words:
We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime, but has begun to focus on a par-
ticular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police
carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminat-
ing statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity
to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him
of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been
denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to
the Constitution as 'made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment,' Gideon v. Wainwright 372 U.S., at 342, and that no state-
ment elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him
at a criminal trial.
2 1
Because the circumstances in Escobedo were unique, however, many
state and lower federal courts focused on the peculiar factual situation
rather than on the broad principles spelled out in the opinion.
19. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
20. Supra note 6.




The great variety of response by the lower courts was predictable
in light of the public furor aroused by the Escobedo case. The Seventh
Circuit took the position that sixth amendment rights are not violated
unless the accused has asked for and been denied the help of an at-
torney. 22 The Eighth Circuit, however, indicated it would still use
the traditional measure of voluntariness for a confession obtained in
the absence of counsel.23 The Tenth Circuit refused to give Escobedo
a "broad interpretation,"2 while the Fifth Circuit took an expansive
view.25 And in the District of Columbia Circuit, the Escobedo prob-
lem met a division within the circuit itself.' A few states, the most
notable being California, made broad interpretations of Escobedo;2
most of the state supreme courts, however, sought to limit application
of its doctrine to facts identical to those in the Escobedo case.28 As a
result of this narrow view of the nature of the pre-arraignment process
and the unanswered question of the retroactivity of Escobedo, the
federal courts were flooded with applications for post-conviction relief
from state prisoners.P
This widespread refusal by the courts and the police to look beyond
the unique facts in Escobedo in order to understand the language of
the opinion, made it clear that the court would have to clarify its posi-
tion. The Miranda cases, because they were so ordinary and so typical
of the cases in our state criminal courts, were selected for that pur-
pose:
We have undertaken a thorough re-examination of the Escobedo decision
and the principles that it announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but
an explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution-that
'No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself,' and that, 'the accused . . . shall have the Assistance of
Counse'-rights which were put in jeopardy in that case through official over-
bearing.
38
This case has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited legal
debate since it was decided two years ago. Both state and federal courts, in
22. United States v. Kountis, 350 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1965).
23. Hayes v. United States, 347 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1965).
24. Davidson v. United States, 349 FR.2d 530, 534 (10th Cir. 1965).
25. Clifton v. United States, 341 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1965).
26. Compare Jackson v. United States, 337 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1964), with Green-
well v. United States, 336 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
27. People v. Dorado, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965).
28. State v. Fox, 131 N.W.2d 684 (Iowa 1964).
29. The question of the retroactivity of both Escobedo and Miranda was decided by
the Supreme Court (7-2) in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). The Court,
with Justices Black and Douglas dissenting, held the rules of each case would be
available only to persons whose trials began after the date of the decisions and would
not be applied retroactively. The dominant consideration seemed to be the flood
gates argument.
30. 384 U.S. at 442.
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assessing its implications, have arrived at varying conclusions. A wealth of
scholarly material has been written tracing its ramifications and under-
pinnings. Police and prosecutor have speculated on its range and desirability.
We granted certiorari in these cases . . . in order further to explore some
facets of the problems, thus exposed, of applying the privilege against self-
incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give concrete constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.
31
What was decided in Miranda was no surprise. The Court reversed
the convictions of Miranda, Westover, and Vignera and affirmed the
reversal of Stewart's conviction. The surprising feature of the Court's
opinion centered around the very specific and detailed rules laid down
for future regulation of pre-arraignment interrogation in both state
and federal courts.32 The Court provided a concise summary of its
holding with these words:
Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to re-
main silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence
against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either re-
tained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights,
provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If,
however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no question-
ing. Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that
he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The
mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some
statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from
31. Id. at 440-42.
32. (a) "... if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must
first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain
silent." Id. at 467-68.
(b) "The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the
explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court."
Id. at 469.
(c) "... we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed
that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him
during interrogation." Id. at 471.
(d) "... it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with
an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent
him." Id. at 472.
(e) "If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during
questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." Id. at 473-74.
(f) "If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must
cease until an attorney is present. At that time, the individual must have an opportunity
to confer with the attorney and to have him present during any subsequent questioning."
Id. at 474.
(g) If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement
is taken, a heavy burden rests on the Government to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right
to retained or appointed counsel." Ibid.
(h) "No distinction can be drawn between statements which are direct confessions
and statements which amount to 'admissions' of part or all of an offense. . . . [n] o
distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be
merely 'exculpatory '" Id. at 475.
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answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and
thereafter consents to be questioned.
33
E. Summary
Throughout the years from Brain to Miranda, the Court constantly
re-examined the multiplicity of interests-individual, social and govern-
mental-visible in the process of in-custody interrogation. Its persis-
tent use of the twin terms "voluntary" and "involuntary," however,
tended to obscure much of the evolution in this area. Originally, the
Court excluded only inculpatory statements made under circumstances
where an innocent man of reasonable firmness might have given a
false confession; all other statements are acceptable. Then the list of
acceptable statements was narrowed to give the courts more effective
control over police procedure. The focus centered upon the accused,
seen not as an innocent man forced into an untrue confession but as an
individual who was also a citizen and, as such, entitled to certain basic
rights without regard to guilt or innocence. Primarily in an effort to
discover why the accused chose not to exercise these rights, the Court
asked whether he even knew that they existed. The age, experience
and intelligence of the accused became the dominant considerations.
With the decision in Miranda, however, the Court has again shifted
its perspective. The focus is now not on the man alone, but on the
man in his environment. The inquiry is not whether there was a
waiver, nor whether there was an intelligent waiver. Instead, the
Court asks whether there was an intelligent waiver in an environment
that would permit and honor nonwaiver. There is less concern with
the fact of waiver and more concern with the accused's awareness and
understanding of the other alternatives available to him.
A natural by-product of the evolution of judicial acceptance of
inculpatory declarations has been the erosion of the fiction that in-
culpatory statements, exculpatory statements, and confessions are
discreet entities entitled to differential judicial treatment. Now the
Court views them for what they are-the fruits from one tree-the
products of in-custody interrogation.
IV. SOME OBSERVATIONS
Any comments on a case as important as Miranda must be tentative
until sufficient time has elapsed to accumulate accurate data about its
impact upon the criminal law processes. The court laid down very
specific rules and made it clear that any deviation from these rules
would cause a confession, otherwise admissible, to be excluded on con-
stitutional grounds. Nothing useful can be said now about the wisdom
of making comprehensive law today for cases not to be heard until
33. Id. at 444-45.
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tomorrow. Nevertheless, some questions may be raised about the
foundation on which Mirandds black letter rules stand. For example,
is it possible that, with the exception of confessions extracted by brute
force, all confessions are voluntary because they are prompted by an
inward compulsion to confess? If so, upon whom should we place
the burden of proving that the confession was voluntary? Are there
ethical problems for the attorney who tries to meet the burden of
proof requirements set out in Miranda? Does Miranda affect the
poisoned tree doctrine? These are only some of the questions which
must be considered in any attempt to evaluate this decision.
A. The Voluntary Confession
Is Miranda a step forward or a step backward in the search for a
rational, constitutional method for dealing with confessions? The
courts, both state and federal, have for many years refused to accept
an "involuntary" confession. The hallmark of involuntariness has
evolved from the original "blood of the accused" test to today's in-
communicado, attorneyless and unadvised criterion. Those who
thought the cases following Escobedo would declare unconstitutional
the use of all confessions were doomed to disappointment. Mr. Chief
Justice Warren ended that speculation with these words:
In dealing with statements obtained through interrogation, we do not
purport to find all confessions inadmissible. Confessions remain a proper
element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily
without compelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence ...
There is no requirement that police stop a person who enters a police station
and states that he wishes to confess to a crime, or a person who calls the
police to offer a confession or any other statement he desires to make. Vol-
unteered statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment
and their admissibility is not affected by our holding today.34
Thus a line is drawn, albeit an unclear one, between the "volun-
teered" confession and the confession produced by interrogation. Is
it realistic to draw such a line? Modern psychiatric knowledge, which
fails to distinguish between inward and outward compulsion, provides
us with little insight into why a man confesses his transgressions. But
this we do know: there is a phenomenon recognized as a compulsion
to confess, and it exists independent of visible outside pressure. Should
such compulsive action be given formal recognition by the legal pro-
cess? Chief Justice Warren speaks of confessions "given freely and
without any compelling influences."35 Is there such a confession, or
are they all the products of compelling influences? 36 Unfortunately,
34. Id. at 478.
35. Ibid.
36. Surely not all "compelling influences" are dressed in police blue.
[ Vor,. 20
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Miranda does not give us a definitive answer to the question, how
compelling is "compelling"?
Any parent has seen his child confess to a yet undiscovered offense
against the law of the household. The child thus reasserts his claim
to family status which, he suspects, may have been lost because of
his offense. At the same time he asks, unconsciously, for some sanc-
tion to be imposed-hopefully to be imposed with love-by the law-
giver in his household. Most adults remember their own "George
Washington and the cherry tree" episode; some, no doubt, without a
happy ending. This compulsion to confess and be re-admitted to
society does not end with childhood. Ask any policeman how many
times he has investigated the scene of a crime and found evidence
that is as clear an indication of the identity of the culprit as an en-
graved calling card. Uncounted times men have been caught and
convicted for making the same childish mistake in the execution of
their crime. This cannot always be solely attributed to the fact that
they are too stupid to learn from their mistakes. It must also be attri-
buted, at least in part, to an underlying desire to be caught and
sanctioned. Any large police station has a modus operandi file. This
file is indexed, not by the criminals' names, but by the methods used in
the commission of criminal acts. Are these methods repeated solely
because of the success enjoyed; is it because the offender is too lazy
or too stupid to change his technique; or is there an overtone some-
how related to the child's compulsion to confess? Nor to be forgotten
are the numerous senseless crimes. For example, someone burglarizes
a filling station but takes only a few cans of oil and some candy, while
the cash register, plainly visible, remains untouched. Too many adults
have been caught and convicted of such apparently meaningless
crimes for us merely to accept the answer that this is a child-like mind
at work. Self-identification at the scene of the crime ranges from
lipstick writing on a wall screaming "catch me before I kill again"
to graffiti on a public monument identifying the writer, his phone
number, address, and the name of his current love. If the layman
and the policeman can see and recognize these things, the psychiatrist
should be able to give us some clear insight into this remarkable com-
pulsion to confess.37 Unfortunately, when we turn to the psychiatric
37. The author spent several years as a prosecuting attorney in a small town.
During this time it was his job to take confessions from many accused persons. Out
of the multitude of confessions only one was knowingly attempted by any form of
physical or mental coercion, and that attempt was completely unsuccessful. The chief
recollection of the others is that the accused seemed anxious for the recitation of their
rights to end so that they could start to tell their wonderful tale of derring-do. In
fact, the major problem was to get the accused to stop confessing. Once the dam of
silence was cracked the waters of confession poured forth in a mighty flood. It must
also be reported that after giving their confession, and thus securing whatever psycholog-
ical relief it brought them, they were placed in jail where some self-made "lawyer"
1966 ]
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writings we discover little to benefit courts or lawyers. We further
discover that little investigation has been done on this recurrent phe-
nomenon.
In the book Why Men Confess, 0. John Rogge lists the component
parts of the compulsion to confess. They are: (1) feelings of guilt
and sin, (2) feelings of rebellion against parents and society, (3) lack
of parental love, and (4) the need for punishment.38 Rogge's thesis
is based on historical examples of confession and on collaboration by
prisoners of war. There is little to indicate that he observed the data
available at local police precincts.
A more conventional psychological approach is that propounded by
Guttmacher and Weihofen:
39
A large number of criminals voluntarily confess immediately following
apprehension. This is more likely to occur in the neurotic than in the
normal individual. The neurotics either have a harsher superego than the
normal or they are less capable of tolerating its strictures.
* 0 *
Some criminals have a conscious need to rid themselves of their intolerable
feeling of guilt. Others confess impulsively, being themselves unaware of
why they do so. They are following the harsh mandates of the unconscious
portion of their superegos in order to reduce their internal tensions.
*0 *
Certainly criminals spontaneously confess after arrest, even when the
evidence against them is meager and when there is apparently little for
them to gain through their admission of guilt. This same phenomenon, in
somewhat exaggerated form, is frequently exhibited by errant spouses. It
inmate would promptly advise them-"Don't tell nobody nuthin." Their next visitor
being their defense counsel, he was generally met with a complete concoction of lies
about the crime and the prisoner's role in it. The accused having satisfied, at least for
a time, the compulsion to confess, was not about to give any secrets to his own lawyer.
This is one advantage possessed by the State that the Miranda case is unlikely to
seriously affect. The professional criminal is unlikely to admit his role in a crime and
no amount of pressure short of extreme physical brutality will wring a confession from
him. Mention must be made of the succession of mentally ill people who show up
after any notorious crime to "confess" their part in it. Sometimes their story is so
convincing that days are lost before it is learned that they had nothing to do with the
crime. These cases usually occur when the crime has received extended coverage by
the news media.
38. "Those who confess are trying to obtain or regain love and ward off feared retalia-
tion. They are in effect saying: forgive me and love me again; punish me, beat me,but love me again..."If the innocent will confess in order to gain love, of course so will the guilty.
That is why there are so many kinds of confessions. Those who are guilty of some
criminal offense are under such anxiety lest they have lost love and lest there will be
retaliation that they usually confess . . . . Lady MacBeth walked in her sleep, rubbed
her hands as if washing them, and cried: "Out, damned spotl Out, I sayl"' ROGer,
WrY MEN CONFEss 227-28 (1959). While this book is not an in-depth examination
of the psychological process, it is a fascinating compendium of the confession through
the ages in both fact and literature.
39. GUYIMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCi-ATRY AND THE LA, 377-79 (1952).
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is a mistake to assume that the criminal population is without conscience.
The neurotic component in the personality of criminals is generally higher
than in the population as a whole and they are therefore more, rather than
less, likely to be plagued by doubts and misgivings.
Strictures from the superego generate anxiety which can be most effec-
tively reduced by confession. The transgressor has aligned himself, by dis-
avowing his antisocial acts, with the representatives of good. He can feel
at peace with images of his parents that he has incorporated within himself.
He is no longer beyond the pale.
40
Both books merely describe, although in somewhat more technical
language, that which the layman has already observed for himself.
The reference to "strictures from the superego" means no more and
no less than "conscience." Is there no more substance to the com-
pulsion to confess than a hyperactive conscience? Surely that one
simple explanation cannot alone explain the weird variety of confes-
sion-oriented crimes.
Other writers have made descriptive references to this kind of
human behavior.
[T]here is another point of comparison between neurosis and crime, and
that is the sense of guilt. A feeling of guilt is an outstanding feature seen
in a compulsory obsessional neurosis, anxiety hysteria, and in schizophrenia
or other types of psychosis. Some crimes are motivated not by the wish for
profit but by an unconscious need to be punished. In this case one would
expect to find the same psychological mechanisms behind the performance
of a crime as behind a neurosis of a psychosis. There is clinical support for
the belief that self-punishment should be thought of as a cause of crime.41
This descriptive treatment of the phenomenon of criminal confession
appears no more profound when attempted by the trained psychiatric
writer than when attempted by the layman. Although both agree
that "confession is good for the soul," neither carries this observation
below the first level of descriptive analysis.
40. "There are, of course, some perfectly obvious reasons for criminals to confess:
hope of obtaining the consideration of the court in its sentence; hope of preventing
conviction in certain crimes by admitting guilt in others; hope of protecting con-
federates by relating apparently full and frank details of the crime, etc. Id. at
377.
41. ABRAmAMSEN, CRIME A ND HUMAN MIND 32 (3d ed. 1944). It must
not be supposed that the lack of psychological writing about the confessional
mechanism means that the other aspects of the same crimes have not been examined
in depth. Crime is as complex as the mind of the human who commits the act. In
describing a burglary where little of real value was taken, Bromberg makes this state-
ment: "This speculation-of an unconscious rape fantasy in the psychological matrix
of burglary-receives added support from the fact that younger burglars often steal
inexpensive or even worthless articles. The excitement of entering a locked area seems
a greater stimulus for the burglary than the intrinsic value of the articles stolen."
BnoMBano, CaIME AIM =z Mn 231 (1965). The rape fantasy explanation of the
selection of the crime to be committed does not exclude the desire to be caught and
punished which could be expressed in the same crime in a variety of ways. .
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The rationale of prohibiting police brutality in the guise of obtain-
ing a confession from a criminal is obvious-we cannot permit the
commission of crime in the name of the state. Nevertheless, we dis-
cover the continued use of the term "involuntary" to describe confes-
sions even when we move beyond this level of the interrogation prob-
lem. While it is true that police manuals describe in detail methods
to scare or seduce a confession, there is no evidence that such tech-
niques will work in the absence of an inward compulsion to confess.
And yet the appellate courts in our state and federal systems have
predicated major policy decisions in the criminal law exclusively on an
elaborate analysis of the outward and external indicia of what must be
largely an internal compulsion. 42 Perhaps the objection comes too late.
We may have already woven too fine an artificial mesh of rules and
notions to permit ever again an in-depth analysis of the confessional
process. The tightly elucidated rules governing interrogation of an
accused which were announced in Miranda seem to leave little room
for change. Yet, the Chief Justice stated that this listing was not in-
tended forever to close the door. 43
If these statements are viewed in conjunction with the portion of
the opinion indicating that the Court did not intend to exclude con-
fessions "given freely and voluntarily without compelling influences,"
44
there may yet be room for fundamental changes in the manner in
which the law treats the confession. If different rules are needed, how-
ever, it is clear that they must preserve the spirit of the Miranda deci-
sion-that is, the effective elimination of real outward compulsion. For
example, if future psychological research should reveal that most con-
fessions are compelled from within (and therefore "voluntary" using
the Court's meaning of the term) and that only a few examples of
actual outward compulsion exist,45 new rules could be devised to take
advantage of, and be completely compatible with, this new knowledge
and the old spirit. Such rules, of course, would have to continue to pro-
hibit real external compulsion through either exclusionary rules, or,
42. There seems to be a real analogy between the method we have adopted to
secure a confession and the methods adopted by the Indians who danced for rain. If
they danced on a cloudy day it usually rained. When we apply our sophisticated
techniques of interrogation to a person whose conscience is filled with guilt feelings,
he confesses. One cannot help wondering what would have been the result had the
United States Weather Bureau predicated some of its important weather forecasting
techniques on an elaborate analysis of the dance movements of Indian rain makers.
43. 384 U.S. at 479.
44. Id. at 492.
45. The existence of real outward compulsion should not depend on what the
interrogator believes himself to be accomplishing but on what is actually taking place-




perhaps, direct sanctions on interrogators.
4 6
In any event, there is ample evidence from the mutually comple-
mentary disciplines of psychology and psychiatry to indicate that the
rules announced in Miranda may lack a firm foundation. While many
may now consider it to be too large a step forward into the unknown,
future psychiatric knowledge may prove it to have been too large a
step backward.
B. Butrden of Proof
In the least publicized, but in legal effect perhaps the most im-
portant, portion of the Miranda opinion, the Court placed the burden
of proving the voluntary nature of the confession squarely upon the
prosecution.47 This burden of proof will not be met by showing silence
on the part of the accused when informed of his right.48 Furthermore,
any evidence of threat or trick or cajolery in inducing the confession
will disprove the state's contention of voluntariness.49
Wigmore 0 states there are five distinguishable attitudes among the
states on the issue of how the burden of proof of voluntariness is to
be met. The two dominant positions are:
(1) The prosecution must show the confession was made volun-
tarily. (This appears to be the majority view held by twenty-nine
states, the United States Supreme Court, England, Ireland,
Canada, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico).
(2) The confession is prima facie admissible and the burden is
on the accused to show improper inducement. (This is the view
held by Wigmore and fourteen states). 51
The current English rule52 takes a middle path and receives the
confession unless attacked as improperly induced, at which time the
prosecution must carry the burden of convincing the court that the
confession was voluntary. 3
All this is now prologue. Miranda places that "heavy" burden of
proof on the state "if the interrogation continues without the presence
of an attorney." Presumably, this aspect of the decision does not
46. The other possible result of such expanded knowledge could be a determination
that any confession, no matter how voluntary it may appear, is still involuntary because
of the irresistable nature of the inward compulsion. This result is highly unlikely in
view of the useful nature of the confession.
47. 384 U.S. at 475.
48. Ibid.
49. Id. at 476.
50. 3 WiGMoRE, EvmFcF. § 860 (3d ed. 1940).
51. Several states have appeared on both sides of this issue at different times and
depending on the nature of the crime and the type of impropriety. See the collected
cases. Ibid.
52. Regina v. Thompson [1893] 2 Q.B. 12.
53. Cf. State v. Mares, 43 Utah 225, 192 P.2d 861 (1948).
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materially affect the federal practice, which had placed the burden on
the prosecution prior to Miranda. But what effect does it have upon
the states wherein the confession was presumed to be admissible?
Clearly, in the absence of an attorney, the rule in those states must
now conform to the federal practice. Not so clear, however, is what
these states must do with a confession, inculpatory or exculpatory
statement given in the presence of an attorney. May they continue
the old practice and presume such a statement to be prima facie
admissible, leaving the burden of proof of involuntariness to the
accused? The fact that a full confession given in the presence of
counsel may be rare does not alter the basic question involved. Time
alone will answer the concomitant question of whether supposedly
exculpatory statements uttered in the presence of counsel and later
offered as declarations against interest or for purposes of impeachment
will be of any substantial significance. It is not difficult to imagine a
situation where an inexperienced counsel called to a police station
confers briefly with the accused, believes the accused's exculpatory
explanation, and advises him to talk with the police-only later to
regret this decision when he learns that the statement is a fabric of
lies. In states where the burden of proof has traditionally been on the
state, there would appear to be somewhat more opportunity for the
defendants to challenge such a statement than in the minority juris-
dictions.
Mr. Chief Justice Warren makes it clear that waiver will not be
presumed from a silent record. The state must prove that the accused
was properly warned, that he understood the warning, and that he
voluntarily and intelligently waived his rights.54 Obviously, none of
the questions of waiver or burden of proof would be raised in the
absence of an incriminating statement by the accused. The state
will always be faced with the problem of gathering and preserving
two distinct lines of evidence in any interrogation- (1) the incrimi-
nating statements, and (2) proof that they were voluntarily made.
Superficially, this would appear to be no additional problem for those
jurisdictions that have traditionally placed the burden on the state.
Of course, now they must prove more-offer of counsel to the indigent,
agreement to hold up interrogation until counsel is present and the
like-but the techniques of this proof would not appear to have been
altered. Yet, what effect will the following language in Miranda
have on this traditional technique? "Moreover, any evidence that the
accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of
course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privi-
lege." (Emphasis added.)55 Does "any" evidence mean "any evidence
54. 384 U.S. at 475.
55. Id. at 476.
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at all"? If it does, then to prevent the use of a confession or inculpa-
tory statement, an accused need only assert at the hearing on his
motion to suppress that he was "threatened, tricked, or cajoled." If
"any" does not mean "any evidence at all" but rather "any substantial"
evidence, questions of waiver still cannot be handled as they have
been in most jurisdictions in the past. In practice, burden of proof
has been met by recitations in the proferred confession that it was
voluntary and that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights,
coupled with statements from one or two witnesses to this same
effect. The defendant has not been able to overcome this evidence
simply by stating that he was acting involuntarily; instead, he has had
to corroborate his assertion by bringing in other evidence to demon-
strate involuntariness. This other evidence usually included such
things as length of the interrogation, physical evidence of brutality,
and the accused's age and intelligence. The best evidence would be
the testimony of the police officer who conducted the interrogation
that he overbore the will of the accused. This kind of evidence,
obviously, will be most difficult, if not impossible, to produce.56
Will the state be able to overcome the simple assertion of involun-
tariness? It is obvious it will not be overcome by an equally simple
assertion of voluntariness. To what extent must the defendant's
assertion be answered? The Court speaks of a "heavy" burden on the
prosecution.57 It is not unrealistic to presume that this means a
quantum of proof equivalent to "beyond all reasonable doubt." How
the state will meet such a requirement, how it will make open and
public that which was done in seclusion and private remains to be
seen. While such a requirement does not diminish the usefulness of
interrogation as an aid to criminal investigation, it does lessen the
likelihood of the direct product of such interrogation being used at the
trial of the confessor. But then, perhaps "any" does not mean "any"
after all.
58
C. The Ethical Dilemma
Directly related to the problems of proof raised by Miranda is the
issue of the role of the defense lawyer who appears at the interrogation
on behalf of the accused. If the lawyer is convinced that the state-
56. At least one exception to this statement was reported in an article bylined by
Kathy Couric, The Eufaula Tribune (Alabama), Aug. 18, 1966, p. 1. "[Defense
counsel's] objections were overruled, despite the facts that [the arresting officer]
admitted from the stand that he had conducted both the search of private property
and arrest without warrants, and at the arrest had failed to inform [the accused] of
his constitutional rights."
57. 384 U.S. at 475.
58. A variation on this sentence was a favorable teaching tool of Thomas Porter
Hardman during his years as Dean of the West Virginia University College of Law.
"Perhaps 'any' doesn't mean 'any' after all." No graduate of that school could ever
forget his rolling combination of West Virginia and Oxford accents as he took a full
ten seconds to speak those few words.
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ment of his client was or might have been the product of coercion,
may he continue to represent the client at the trial of the case? His
evidence, as a witness, of involuntariness would be of material benefit
to the accused should the state offer the client's confession into
evidence,5 9 yet it is improper to serve as both attorney and material
witness in the same trial. Canon Nineteen of the Canons of Pro-
fessional Ethics of the American Bar Association provides:
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters,
such as the attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should
leave the trial of the case to other counsel. Except when essential to the
ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his
client.6 0
In no sense could testimony of coercion be considered merely a formal
matter when the question is the admissibility of a confession. This
may well mean that the lawyer who appears at an interrogation and
sees evidence of coercion will be precluded from further representa-
tion, at least at the trial, of the person he was expected to represent.61
Nor should the other side of the coin be forgotten. If the lawyer
is present during an interrogation and the client gives a statement to
the police, may the lawyer properly raise the issue of coercion if he
is personally convinced there was no coercion? This is not the same
as the question of whether an attorney can properly represent one
whom he knows to have committed the charged offense. In the latter
case, the attorney is not called upon to proffer an untruth to the
court, but rather to see that his client receives all of the incidents
of a fair trial. In the case of the confession, however, he would have
to participate with his client in offering to the court evidence of
coercion which he knows or believes to be untrue. Of course, he
need not take the stand himself; but he must permit his client to
offer evidence that the confession was involuntary. If such conduct
does not cross the line between ethical and unethical practice, it most
certainly comes close to that line. To require an attorney to move
into the gray zone of questionable conduct is beyond the power of the
court or of the client. Yet, if the client is to be permitted to raise
59. The Court mentions this role but does not comment further on it in Miranda.
"With a lawyer present the likelihood that the police will practice coercion is reduced,
and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in court." 384 U.S.
at 470.
60. For a detailed analysis of Canon 19, see DRIxNKE, LEGAL ETrmcs 158-59 (1953).
61. To a limited extent this gives the police some control over who shall represent
any given defendant. If the defendant sends for counsel whom the police would
prefer not handle the case, they could trade a confession for a lawyer. While it is
not likely this would happen often it is grossly improper that it happen even once.
Some rather sophisticated interpretation of the Canons or of Miranda will have to be
done in this exceptional case to prevent the state from profiting from its own wrong.




questions of coercion, he must also be permitted to have the services
of an attorney.
The concept of representation in the station house is a new one to
the legal profession; and the old Canons, predicated on office and
courtroom practice, may well have to be modified to encompass this
new role for the lawyer. This is not to say that we must loosen the
Canons to make ethical that which has been unethical. What it does
mean is that fresh thought must be given to the ethical role of a
lawyer who wants to give his client full representation from interroga-
tion through appeal.
V. So_ FURTHER QUEsTIoNS
Miranda has an assured place in future criminal law textbooks. It
will be the basis for countless appeals. But it did not resolve all prob-
lems concerning the use of confessions. Where, for example, will the
police officers secure the services of an attorney for the indigent-
accused whom they wish to interrogate? Miranda leaves no choice-
either the police produce counsel when counsel is requested, or they
forego the interrogation. Even if an attorney is made available, the
presumption seems to be almost conclusive that he will advise his
client not to make any admissions to the police. If this assumption
is correct, will the resultant loss in numbers of confessions bring about
a concomitant loss in the number of successful prosecutions? In an
article in the New York Times Magazine,12 Judge Irving R. Kaufman
collected educated, but divergent guesses on this issue,63 and con-
cluded that "once again, an authoritative and unequivocal answer is
62. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1966, § 6 (Magazine), p. 37.
63. "A recent survey of the procedures adopted by police and prosecutors in Kings
County led Judge Nathan Sobel to conclude that the significance of confessions to
criminal prosecution has been vastly overstated. Of the cases which he examined,
Judge Sobel found that "'confessions" constitute part of the evidence in less than
10 per cent of all indictments.' A New York statute requires that the prosecution give
the defense advance notice that it will offer incriminating statements of the accused
in evidence; since Judge Sobel found that such notice was given in only 86 of 1,000
recent cases, he concluded that 'in the great majority of cases, guilt [is] established
without the police . . . ever having questioned the defendant at all.'
"But the Kings County statistics disclosed by Judge Sobel may not be representative
of the country as a whole-and perhaps not even of New York City's four other boroughs.
Shortly after publication of Judge Sobel's study, Manhattan's District Attorney Frank
Hogan responded by citing figures of his own. In 27 per cent of the homicide cases
then pending in New York County, Mr. Hogan insisted, an indictment would not
have been obtained without a confession. He added that he planned to offer confessions
in evidence in no less than 68 per cent of these cases.
"Finally, to further complicate the 'numbers game,' Detroit's Chief of Detectives
Vincent Piersante has offered additional statistics which seem to indicate that the
Miranda requirements may not prevent the securing of confessions after all. More than
a year before the Miranda decision was announced, the Detroit police decided to
notify all suspects of their right to remain silent and to retain counsel. In the first




One ancient state-federal conflict was resolved by Miranda: the
controversy over the amount of time that could elapse between arrest
and presentation of the arrested person to a committing magistrate.
The federal rule was set forth in McNabb v. United States.65 There the
Court excluded the product of an interrogation because the accused
had not been brought promptly before a committing magistrate. This
requirement is formally embodied in rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.66 In Upshaw v. United States, 67 the Court
made it clear that the adoption of rule 5(a) implied no relaxation
of the McNabb doctrine. But then, in 1957, the Supreme Court
decided Mallory v. United States.68 This case focused on the meaning
of the phrase "without unnecessary delay" found in rule 5(a), and
muddled the waters by using "as quickly as possible" and by stating
that a "brief delay" is permissible. Completely obscured by the con-
troversy over "elapsed clock time" was the reason for the rule:
Since such unwarranted detention led to tempting utilization of intensive
interrogation, easily gliding into the evils of the third degree, the Court . . .
[referring to McNabb] held that police detention of defendants beyond the
time when a committing magistrate was readily accessible constituted willful
disobedience of law.
69
Almost all of the states refused to adopt and enforce the federal
practice required by McNabb and Mallory. They preferred to focus
their attention on the question of "elapsed clock time" between arrest
and preliminary hearing rather than face the more fundamental
question of the evil spawned by this detention.70 Although the
Supreme Court has never made the McNabb-Mallory doctrine one of
constitutional dimension by applying the rule directly to the states
under the fourteenth amendment, it seems clear that the decision in
obtained in 56.1 per cent of all homicide cases, as against 53 per cent four years
earlier, when no such warnings were offered." Id. at 47, 50.
64. Id. at 47.
65. 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
66. RULE 5. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER
(a) Appearance before the Commissioner. An officer making an arrest under
a warrant issued upon a complaint or any person making an arrest without a
warrant shall take the arrested person without unnecessary delay befote the
nearest available commissioner or before any other nearby officer empowered to
commit persons charged with offenses against the laws of the United States.
When a person arrested without a warrant is brought before a commissioner
or any other officer, a complaint shall be filed forthwith. FED. R. Cram. P. 5(a).
67. 335 U.S. 410 (1948).
68. 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
69. Id. at 453.
70. See cases collected in INBAU & REID, LIE DETECTION AND CIUAIINAL INVESTICA-
nON 210 n.157 (3d ed. 1953). Such avoidance is usually justified by reference to rule
5(a) as a matter of federal procedure designed only for federal affairs, thus suggesting
that the rationale of Mallory-McNabb is without constitutional dimension.
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Miranda has so carefully proscribed the procedure the police may
follow in an interrogation that it has rendered the clock time argu-
ment not only moot but quite dead. Mallory and McNabb have been
imposed on the states not in the form of their specific rule but in the
shape of the reason that gave rise to the rule.
Many problems are inseparably tied to any consideration of the
Miranda rules. If the police fail to give appropriate warning to the
subject of an interrogation, will the fruits of his statement, as opposed
to the statement itself, still be admissible in court? If the subject
should fully admit his part in a robbery and tell the police where the
stolen goods are hidden, will the prosecution be able to introduce at
his trial these fruits of the crime and other physical evidence such
as the accused's fingerprints found on the stolen property? Such
evidence, though circumstantial, could be even more effective for
the prosecution than would have been his inadmissible signed state-
ment.
May the police accomplish indirectly that which they cannot accom-
plish directly? They might decide to use coercive interrogation
techniques on John Doe to secure information for use in the prosecu-
tion of Richard Roe. We are told that constitutional rights are
personal and cannot be claimed by another. We are also told, however,
that one of the principal ends to be served by the exclusionary rule
is to force the police to obey the law while enforcing the law. When
these concepts clash, as they would in the above example, which one
must give way?
We do not know yet whether a confession obtained without
apprising the confessor of his rights can properly serve as a club
to induce a guilty plea. Nor does Miranda solve the major problem
of the judicially coerced confession, i.e., the guilty plea given under
duress. The classic example of this problem is found in those courts
where the judge has the reputation of handing out harsh sentences
to those who are tried and found guilty, and moderate sentences to
those who plead guilty. Even more flagrant is the example of a
judge joining with the prosecution in the plea-negotiation-process by
informing an accused of the compromise sentence he will impose if
the accused enters a guilty plea. If one regards the confession as an
extrajudicial plea of guilty, the matter of a judicially coerced con-
fession then is not unduly remote from the Miranda rationale. The
pressure to enter a guilty plea, coupled with the inducement of a
lesser sentence, is closely related to the pressure to confess coupled
with a promise to seek leniency. Even though the accused has the
assistance of counsel, he may not be so completely free of pressure
that his choice to plead guilty can be regarded as entirely voluntary.
What is to be regarded as "harmless error" in the application of the
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Miranda rules? If an arrested person is placed in isolation for several
hours and is only fully informed of his rights when he is brought
into the detective's office for interrogation, the letter of Miranda has
been met-but not the spirit. Consider the man who is warned of his
rights on Wednesday night by the arresting policeman and is inter-
rogated on Thursday afternoon by a detective who fails to repeat
the warning. The man placed in a line-up of suspects and required
to speak certain words is not being interrogated for a confession. Can
he agree to cooperate without the requisite warning?
The list of questions is as endless as the parade of accused who
will raise them. Nevertheless, one fact remains relatively clear. The
Court has established some firm boundaries by the Miranda rules; and
these boundaries give the accused, the police, and the lower courts
more guidance than they have ever had in the past. Without this
black-letter law, the language of Escobedo might have been inter-
preted into nothingness. As Chief Justice Traynor has observed:
The loftier the message and the more removed from the local scene, the
more difficult it is for the judges on the ground to work out the ground
rules. If they fail to transpose the message into earthy language, either
because of their own ineptitude or because the message itself defies trans-
position, it continues to plane in the stratosphere with ill effect to itself as
well as to those who are grounded. A rugged constitution, by definition
the law of the land, suffers a loss of vitality when it must circle in thin air
indefinitely.71
The lack of acceptance of Escobedo was perhaps caused as much
from its lofty language as from the unique facts which gave rise to its
claim. But Miranda may run the danger of the other extreme. Black-
letter law, specific rules designed to cover the infinite variety of
possible human conduct, has for centuries invited ignorance of prin-
ciple by artful construction conforming to the letter of the law but
wholly avoiding its spirit. The spirit of Miranda could similarly
become obscured.
Miranda v. Arizona must be regarded as the standard by which the
conduct of pre-arraignment interrogation will be measured for years
to come. But unlike the flexible standard of Plimsoll's mark, which
legally establishes varying submersion levels for ships according to
their loads and the seas, Miranda establishes only a single standard
to be applied in every case. Perhaps it would have been more useful
if the Court had given some latitude for evaluation of pre-arraignment
interrogation against a scale which takes account of the loads and seas
of human conduct. Only time will tell.
71. Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial,
21 REconD oF N.Y.C.B.A. 359 (1966).
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